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RECENT CASES
The Blue Chip decision illustrates that the Supreme Court will not
grant standing to a plaintiff in a lOb-5 action without more than lip service
to the purchaser-seller requirement of Birnbaum. While not specifically
rejecting the lower court exceptions to the Birnbaum doctrine, the Court
indicated an unwillingness to continue the prior trend of relaxing standing
requirements. If this reasoning is followed, the decision will provide the
field of securities regulation with a much-needed semblance of national
uniformity, while at the same time provide most deserving plaintiffs re-
dress in the courts.
WILLIAM E. EvANS
TAXATION-DEPENDENCY EXEMPTIONS-LODGING
DEEMED FURNISHED BY DIVORCED PARENT WHO
IS ENTITLED TO EXCLUSIVE USE AND OCCUPANCY
Pugel v. Commissioner1
At the time of Jean and Stanley Pugel's divorce, they owned a family
residence as community property. The divorce decree merely ordered the
sale of the residence and the division of the proceeds between the Pugels.2
Ms. Pugel was awarded custody of their three minor children. Subsequent
to the divorce, the house was occupied by Ms. Pugel, her three children,
and her sister. Ms. Pugel claimed dependency exemptions for her three
children on her federal income tax return.3 The Commissioner determined
that the children were not her dependents because she had not furnished
over one-half of their support.4 The determinative issue was which parent
was to receive credit for furnishing the lodging for the dependent children.5
The Commissioner took the position that each parent had provided one-
half of the housing support. The Tax Court held that Ms. Pugel was
entitled to a dependency exemption for each of the three children because:
(1) she had the exclusive right to the use and occupancy of the home;
(2) such right meant that the lodging would be deemed to have been fur-
nished entirely by her; and (3) the value of the lodging was sufficient
to carry her over the requisite level of support.6
Subject to certain conditions, a taxpayer can claim an exemption for
to expenses and attorney's fees by court award although no other
relief is granted and no settlement is reached.
1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 13, at § 4.7.
1. 34 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 43 (1975).
2. Id. at 44.
3. The current exemption is $750 for each qualified dependent. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 151.
4. 34 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 44.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 46.
1976]
1
Crouch: Crouch: Taxation--Dependency Exemptions
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
a dependent child.7 The Internal Revenue Code provides special rules
when the parents are divorced.8 The general rule is that the parent who
has custody of the child for over one-half of the year is entitled to the
exemption. Two important exceptions qualify this general rule. First, the
noncustodial parent is entitled to the exemption if he contributes at least
$600 to the child's support during the year and the divorce decree or agree-
ment provides that he is to receive the exemption. Second, the noncustodial
parent is entitled to the exemption if he provides at least $1,200 for the
support of the child during the calendar year, unless the custodial parent
"clearly establishes" 9 that she provided over one-half of the support of the
child.
The Internal Revenue Code does not define specifically what is in-
cluded in "support." Regulations10 and case law"1 have clearly recognized
lodging as an element of support. A more difficult issue is how to determine
the value of lodging as support. In two 1955 decisions 12 the Tax Court
held that the fair rental value of the room furnished the dependent is
the proper measure of value. This is now the accepted standard. 13 The
reasoning is that the value of the dependent's lodging must be measured
by the amount he would have had to pay on the open market for similar
housing.' 4
In determining which divorced parent furnishes the lodging, courts
have declared that the owner of the property should be credited with the
value of the lodging because he has the right to its use and possession. 1
When divorced parents are equal owners of the property, each parent
is deemed to have furnished one-half of the lodging.1 6 However, if the
divorce decree provides expressly that one parent shall have the exclusive
right to the use and occupancy of the premises, then the lodging is
deemed to have been furnished entirely by that parent.'1
In Pugel the divorce decree did not expressly award Ms. Pugel the
7. To be eligible for this exemption, the taxpayer must furnish over one-
half of the dependent's total support for the calendar year in which the taxable
year begins. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 152 (a).
8. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 152 (e).
9. This term has been construed to mean a clear preponderance of the
evidence. Labay v. Comm'r, 450 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1971).
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1 (1971).
11. O'Connor v. Comm'r, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 156 (1973); Haynes v.
Comm'r, 23 T.C. 1046 (1955).
12. Emil Blarek, 23 T.C. 1037 (1955); Haynes v. Comm'r, 23 T.C. 1046 (1955).
13. O'Connor v. Comm'r, 82 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 156 (1973); Delbert D.
Bruner, 39 T.C. 534 (1962).
14. Emil Blarek, 23 T.C. 1037, 1039 (1955).
15. O'Connor v. Comm'r, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 156, 158 (1973).
16. Gilliam v. Commr, 429 F.2d 570, 571 (4th Cir. 1970) (joint tenancy);
P.J. Sciortino, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1073, 1076 (1972) ("equally owned"
property); Lindberg v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 243, 247 (1966) ("jointly owned"
property).
17. Wood v. United States, 287 F. Supp. 90 (D. Ore. 1968); Frick v.
Comm'r, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1161 (1963); Delbert D. Bruner, 39 T.C. 534
(1962); see 5 J. MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INcoME TAxATION, § 32.14d (1969).
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RECENT CASES
exclusive right to use and occupancy. The decree simply directed that
the home be sold and specified the manner in which tht. proceeds were
to be divided between the parties. Findings of fact and conclusions of
law accompanying the decree made it clear that Ms. Pugel would not be
required to pay rent pending sale. The Tax Court, in holding that Ms.
Pugel was entitled to exclusive use and occupancy, emphasized that she
was not required to pay rent and that Mr. Pugel had been barred from
entering the premises by several restraining orders.1 8 Thus, Pugel expanded
the exclusive use and occupancy exception .to situations in which the
divorce decree does not provide expressly for such use and occupancy.
The impact of Pugel upon the allocation of lodging support can be
illustrated by five situations. Under the new Missouri dissolution act,19
which allows the court to divide marital property,20 it is probable that
each of these situations will occur frequently. The first situation is when
the parties have equal ownership interests in the property, and they intend
that the custodial parent and the noncustodial. parent receive equal credit
for furnishing the lodging. Pugel. dictates that the decree dearly indicate
this intent, perhaps by emphasizing that the custodial parent is not en-
titled to exclusive use and occupancy of the property. If the decree does
not indicate such intent, the court may conclude that-the custodial 'parent
was to have the exclusive use and occupancy.
The second situation is when the parties have equal ownership in-
terests in the property, but intend that the custodial parent receive full
credit for furnishing the lodging. The best way to assure this result is to
direct specifically in the decree that the custodial parent is entitled to
exclusive use and occupancy of the property. Even if the decree fails
to so direct, however, Pugel establishes that a court will look beyond the
divorce decree to determine if an exclusive right of use. and occupancy
exists.
The third situation is when the noncustodial parent has complete
legal title to the property, and the parties intend that he receive full credit
for furnishing the lodging. This situation was only indirectly dealt with
by the court in Pugel. The court cited Carter v. Commissioner,2 ' a case
involving Oklahoma law. The divorce decree in Carter awarded the non-
custodial parent complete legal title to property that had been owned
previously as joint tenants. Use of the premises was awarded to the cus-
18. 34 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 44, 46.
19. §§ 452.300-.415, RSMo 1973 Supp.
20. Section 452.330, RSMo 1973 Supp., provides:
[T]he court... shall divide the marital property in such proportions as
the court deems just after considering all relevant factors including...
(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the
division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of
awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable
periods to the spouse having custody of any children ..
21. 62 T.C. 20 (1974).
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todial parent during the minority of the children, but the terms of the
decree indicated that this right of occupancy was solely a benefit to the
children and not a recognition of the custodial parent's ownership rights. 22
Such a provision is allowed by Oklahoma law. 23 The court held that the
noncustodial parent had furnished the entire lodging support for the
dependent children.2 4
Dictum in Pugel declared that Carter only qualified the ordinary "use
and occupancy" rule within the specific confines of Oklahoma law.25
The court in Carter recognized that property rights are determined by the
law of the jurisdiction which grants the divorce.2 6 Therefore, it appears
that any similar law of another state could compel the same result. This re-
sult seems especially likely under the new Missouri dissolution act because it
allows the parties to enter into agreements concerning property owned by
either of them.2 7 This agreement is binding on the court, provided that
it is not unconscionable.28 Thus, if the parties agree that the noncustodial
parent is to receive title to the family home and the custodial parent is
to have the use and occupancy of the premises solely as a benefit to the
children during their minority, the noncustodial parent will be deemed
to have furnished the entire housing support to the children. The same
result can be reached by a decree which provides that possession by the
custodial parent is solely a benefit to the children.
The fourth situation is when the decree awards title to the non-
custodial parent, but awards exclusive use and occupancy to the custodial
parent in recognition of her property rights. Although no case law has
dealt with this situation, the custodial parent would apparently receive
full credit for furnishing lodging. The Tax Court has consistently held
that the question of lodging support depends on who has the sole right to
use and occupancy and not on the parents' respective legal interests in the
residence.2 9 Although these cases involved property in which the parents
had equal ownership interests, the rationale is equally applicable to prop-
erty owned solely by the noncustodial parent.
22. The divorce decree contained the following provision with respect to
the house:
That the legal title to the real estate of the parties hereto is hereby
vested in F.M. Carter. That plaintiff shall be entitled to the use of the
premises, rent free, during the minority of the children, to wit: Foy
Montez Carter and Karen Marsette Carter, provided, however, that this
portion of the decree shall be effective only so long as the plaintiff
remains in the house, and lives in said house alone with the children, and
remains single. Upon majority of the children, possession shall revert
to F.M. Carter.
Id. at 24-25.
23. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (1961).
24. 62 T.C. at 26.
25. 34 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 45.
26. 62 T.C. at 25.
27. § 452.325, RSMo 1973 Supp.
28. § 452.325(2), RSMo 1973 Supp.
29. Wood v. United States, 287 F. Supp. 90 (D. Ore. 1968); Delbert D. Bruner,
S9 T.C. 534 (1962).
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